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DEFAMATION, INVASION OF PRIVACY, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF CARE
Jerry J. Phillips*
I. A SHIFT IN DIRECTION: THE Gertz CASE
Prior to June of 1974, it appeared that in all defamation
actions involving matters of public interest, application of the
standard enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' was
constitutionally required: the plaintiff was obliged to prove
that the defendant had published the defamatory material
with reckless disregard for falsity.' In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 3 the United States Supreme Court changed this standard.
The Court held that "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appro-
priate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehoods injurious to a private individual."'
For "public officials" and "public figures," the "reckless
disregard" or constitutional malice5 standard remains intact.
But where private individuals are involved, the states, while
free to impose the exacting constitutional standard, are not
* A.B. 1956, J.D. 1961, Yale University; M.A. 1964, Cambridge University; Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Sullivan involved defamation of public officials. The same standard was ap-
plied to cases involving defamation of public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967), and the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29 (1971), was generally understood as extending the Sullivan standard to all
matters of public interest. For brevity, the standard for both public officials and public
figures will be referred to hereinafter as the Sullivan standard.
3. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4. Id. at 347.
5. See note 2 supra. The constitutional privilege afforded publication concerning
public officials and public figures is lost if the plaintiff can prove that publication was
motivated by "malice," i.e., publication of defamatory material with knowledge of its
falsity or reckless disregard for truth. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1964). The particular
state of mind specified in Sullivan is often called "constitutional malice," to distin-
guish it from common law malice-"spite or . .. improper motive"-which, in a
defamation action, is "implied by the law from an intentional publication of a defama-
tory character" and need not be proved. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs
771-72 (4th ed. 1971).
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required to do so.' They need only set a standard of proof for
defamation of private individuals that is more demanding than
liability without fault; as a minimum, the plaintiff must prove
negligence.
A standard of proof less stringent than constitutional mal-
ice, however, will limit recoverable damages. The Gertz Court
held that "the States may not permit recovery of presumed or
punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a
showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth."7 Thus, a plaintiff who shows only negligent publication
of defamatory material is restricted to "compensation for ac-
tual injury";' he is not, however,
limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary
types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood
include impairment of reputation and standing in the com-
munity, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering . . . . [Tihere need be no evidence which as-
signs an actual dollar value to the injury
The states may, of course, impose additional standards for re-
covery, such as proof of special damages or actual pecuniary
loss, or they may eliminate punitive damages entirely.'" The
Gertz decision simply establishes minimal standards.
It is clear that the thrust of the Gertz opinion is in opposite
directions: on the issue of liability, the Court has moved toward
a more liberal standard of recovery for private individuals; but
on the issue of damages, it has adopted a stricter test, eliminat-
ing punitive awards unless constitutional malice is shown and
prohibiting recovery of compensatory damages based solely on
a presumption of injury.
If it is assumed that constitutional inroads into the defa-
mation area have been prompted chiefly by the Court's concern
with the free-speech implications of excessive damage recover-
6. It is unclear whether the state trend will be to continue application of the
Metromedia standard as a matter of common law. Compare AAFCO Heating & Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974),
with Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
7. 418 U.S. at 349.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 350.
10. See Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 75-1306, 9th Cir., Feb. 10, 1975, prohibiting recovery of punitive dam-
ages by a public figure even though constitutional malice is shown. See also Stone v.




ies, and if it is further assumed that inordinately large awards
are attributable primarily to the availability of punitive dam-
ages," the decision can be viewed as a first amendment bul-
wark. That evaluation may be inaccurate, however, for two
reasons: first, very substantial judgments can be recovered in
defamation actions under the label "compensatory" damages;
and second, the cost of defending a defamation action may
have a substantial chilling effect, even if no judgment, or one
for nominal damages only, is obtained.
The Sullivan standard of liability has proved to be a very
exacting one, allowing few recoveries. The Gertz liability stan-
dard for private individuals is demonstrably more relaxed.'
Essentially, the difference in the two standards is a matter of
policy: the Supreme Court has evaluated competing interests
and determined that the free speech interest shall be accorded
substantially less weight when the reputation of a private indi-
vidual is involved. Why the Court reached this conclusion is
best explained by examining the reasoning of the Gertz opin-
ion.
II. THE POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR GERTZ
In Gertz, the Court offers two fundamental reasons for
affording different treatment in defamation actions to public
and private individuals: first, public officials and public figures
generally have greater access to communications media than
private individuals do, and thus have "a more realistic oppor-
tunity to counteract false statements";'3 and second, public
persons "have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk
of injury from defamatory falsehood .... ""
It is evident that these two generalizations will not prove
true in every case. The Court, however, assumes that under
11. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964).
12. Questions as to the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to establish negli-
gence in defamation cases are outside the scope of this article. Obviously, however,
many problems will be raised. For example, will expert testimony as to the standards
of care prevalent in the communications industry be necessary where the defendant is
a communications medium? Can failure to retract a defamatory statement constitute
negligence under Gertz? Will negligence per se (failure to meet an applicable statutory
standard) be sufficient? Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gertz, decried "the flexibility
which inheres in the reasonable care standard" and expressed fear that its application
will result in substantial muzzling of the press. 418 U.S. at 361.
13. Id. at 344.
14. Id. at 345.
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most circumstances they are accurate, and opts for a rule of
general application in order to avoid the "difficulty of forcing
state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not . .. ",15
Indeed, it is arguable that the second factor, voluntary
exposure, is a legal fiction: although public persons may volun-
tarily seek publicity, they seldom seek to be defamed. The
Court, however, is recognizing a kind of trade-off: if a person
voluntarily seeks public exposure, part of the price he must pay
is the increased risk of being defamed. The only voluntary act
is that of "going public"; the exposure is a necessary and una-
voidable concomitant. Nor does the Court seem disposed to
bend its uniform rule when the facts of an individual case
might show that a particular "public figure" did not voluntar-
ily seek exposure: "Hypothetically, it may be possible for some-
one to become a public figure through no purposeful action of
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures
must be exceedingly rare."'"
Are such instances, in fact, likely to be rare? If not, then
a basic premise of the Gertz decision is unfounded. Moreover,
the Court's preference, as a matter of judicial policy, for uni-
form rule application is undercut: trial courts, in order to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff is a "public" person and thus
whether the Gertz or the Sullivan standard applies, must still
make ad hoc determinations. Further analysis of these issues
requires a closer examination of what the Court means by the
terms "public" and "private."
The "Public" and the "Private" Person
Public officials. The "public official" is probably the easi-
est person to identify in the Court's classification of defamation
plaintiffs, although significant areas of uncertainty exist. In
Rosenblatt v. Baer,7 the Court stated, "[The 'public official'
designation applies at the very least to those among the hier-
archy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the
conduct of government affairs."'" Government employee status
15. Id. at 346.
16. Id. at 345.
17. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
18. Id. at 85.
[Vol. 16
DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY
should generally be fairly easy to determine. But "substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of government
affairs" is another matter. Substantiality is hardly a precise
concept, and raises the spectre of the kind of ad hoc decision-
making which the Court professes to avoid.
Moreover, the test clearly has two prongs, and either will
invoke the Sullivan standard. If the employee has substantial
actual responsibility or control, the Sullivan constitutional
malice rule applies, whatever the appearances may be; and the
same standard will apply despite lack of any actual responsibil-
ity or control, if the employee "appear[s] to the public" to
have such responsibility or exercise such control. 9 This "public
appearance" test clearly suggests that an individual might
"involuntarily" become a public person, if he neither knew nor
had reason to know that he "appeared" to exercise substantial
control over the conduct of government affairs. How does one
characterize a legislator's secretary, who keeps his calendar
and makes sure that he meets all of his appointments on sched-
ule? Does she not have, or appear to have, substantial responsi-
bility or control? Or must the control be direct, rather than
indirect? If so, where is the line that marks off those functions
which have a sufficiently direct effect on the conduct of govern-
ment affairs to trigger the Sullivan standard, from those that
do not?"0
The defamation plaintiff who neither is nor appears to be
a public official with substantial responsibility or power may
still find himself confronting the nearly insurmountable barrier
of the Sullivan test if he is characterized as a "public figure."
Either type of public status will result in the plaintiff's being
required to prove that the defendant published defamatory
material with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth.
Public figures, all-purpose and limited. The Gertz Court
divides public figures into two subcategories:
Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influ-
ence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.
More commonly, those classed as public figures have
19. Id. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
20. Introducing concepts of "direct" or "indirect" control raises serious questions
about the usefulness of the public official rule. What of the state-employed teacher who
may indirectly exercise considerable influence over the future course of government
affairs through the process of educating potential presidents and legislators? If that
hypothetical seems clearly beyond the permissible parameters, how far beyond?
19751
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thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved."
The stricter Sullivan standard presumably applies only
when the alleged defamation involves matters related to a per-
son's public status; as to other matters, the less stringent Gertz
rule applies, even though the person may in fact be a public
figure. The limited applicability of the Sullivan standard is
demonstrated in both Gertz and the earlier case of Garrison v.
Louisiana."
In Garrison, which involved a public official, the Court
held that the public's interest-and thus the protection of the
Sullivan rule-extends to "anything that might touch on an
official's fitness for office." 3 How wide this interest legiti-
mately may be, and how peripheral a matter may be pulled
under the Sullivan umbrella by such public interest, is unclear;
but certainly the Court intended to give "public interest" very
wide scope. The Gertz Court, after discussing Garrison, ob-
served: "Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion."' The suggested analogy between public officials and
public figures is not clear. In Garrison, the test for the applica-
bility of the Sullivan rule was whether the defamatory state-
ments concerned the official's "fitness for office," and by defi-
nition, a public figure is not a public officeholder or govern-
ment employee. Since an "all-purpose public figure" is one
who has attained a general notoriety in the community, or has
become pervasively involved in public affairs,"3 the Court prob-
ably intended to suggest that any matter related to incidents
or affairs that make such an individual a subject of public
interest is entitled to Sullivan protection. Obviously, the scope
of such public interest, as in the case of the public figure, is
very broad.
But the same is not true of the limited-purpose public
figure, as the Gertz decision illustrates. Gertz, a lawyer, had
allegedly been libeled by an article appearing in the magazine
American Opinion, which the Court describes as "a monthly
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society." 6 The matter
21. 418 U.S. at 345.
22. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
23. Id. at 77.
24. 418 U.S. at 345.
25. Id. at 352.
26. 418 U.S. at 325.
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arose in 1968 when "a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot
and killed a youth named Nelson."27 After a coroner's inquest
into the death of the youth, the policeman was prosecuted and
convicted of second degree murder.
The Nelson family retained Gertz to prosecute a wrongful
death action against Nuccio. It was at this juncture that the
defendant became involved. Early in the 1960's the magazine
"began to warn of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local
law enforcement agencies and create in their stead a national
police force capable of supporting a communist dictatorship.""
In March, 1969, American Opinion published an article accus-
ing attorney Gertz of being a part of this conspiracy and citing
the civil prosecution of Nuccio. The article implied that Gertz
had a criminal record, and it labeled him a "Leninist" and a
"Communist-fronter."
5  I
On appeal, the defendant contended that the Sullivan
standard applied, since Gertz was a public figure, either for all
purposes or at least for the limited purpose of the Nuccio affair.
The Court rejected these contentions. Although Gertz had long
been active in civic and professional affairs, had authored
books and articles on legal subjects, and consequently had be-
come "well-known in some circles," he did not qualify as an all-
purpose public figure. The Court stated, "Absent clear evi-
dence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 326.
30. Id. at 351. The Court observed:
Petitioner has long been active in community and professional af-
fairs. He has served as an officer of local civic groups and of various
professional organizations, and he has published several books and arti-
cles on legal subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-known
in some circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the
community. None of the prospective jurors called at the trial had ever
heard of petitioner prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof
that this response was atypical of the local population. We would not
lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and profes-
sional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes.
Id.
The Court also refused to classify plaintiff Gertz as a public official merely be-
cause he "had served briefly on housing committees appointed by the mayor of Chi-
cago" several years earlier; nor was he a public official simply because he was a lawyer
and an "officer of the court," since such a construction would "sweep all lawyers"
within the Sullivan standard and "distort the plain meaning of the 'public official'
category beyond all recognition." Id.
1975]
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life." 3 Nor was the Court willing to assign Gertz to the limited-
purpose public figure category, since the attorney's activities
"related solely to his representation of a private client."'3'
The line between the all-purpose and the limited-purpose
public figure is blurred in the opinion. There is a suggestion
that Gertz might have qualified as an all-purpose figure if the
jurors in the wrongful death case "had ever heard" of him prior
to that litigation-at least if the jurors' recognition were typical
"of the local population." This kind of notoriety would more
properly be classified as limited-purpose.
The Gertz Court's indicia of limited-purpose public status
are even more uncertain. Apparently, Gertz, might have been
a public figure for the limited purposes of the Nuccio affair if
he had played something more than "a minimal role at the
coroner's inquest"; if he had in some way taken part "in the
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio"; or if he had discussed,
or been quoted as discussing, either "the criminal or civil litiga-
tion with the press.31 2 Would the presence of any one of these
factors have thrust Gertz "into the vortex of this public issue?"
If not, what combination of factors, or what degree of involve-
ment in society's affairs, would have rendered Gertz a public
figure? What other possible factors not discussed by the Court
might have been relevant to the outcome, had they existed? Is
Gertz now a public figure because he carried his case to the
United States Supreme Court and provided the material for a
major decision on the law of defamation? It seems patent that
courts attempting to apply the Gertz rule cannot avoid being
embroiled in ad hoc determinations of all-purpose and limited-
purpose public status, which probably will be no less complex
than the task of determining whether issues are of general or
public interest.
Moreover, it is at the limited public status level that ques-
tions of voluntary involvement become most acute. Would
Gertz have been consciously involving himself in public issues,
accepting the trade-off of increased risk of defamation in return
31. Id. at 352. In support of its holding, the Court noted that petitioner played a
minimal role at the coroner's inquest. . . . He took no part in the criminal prosecution
of Officer Nuccio. Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation
with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in
an attempt to influence its outcome. Id.
32. See note 31 supra.
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for greater public exposure, if, for example, he had asked ques-
tions of the accused at the inquest? What if the press had
sought him out for comments on the case? Would he have been
obliged to remain silent or lose his private status? Suppose it
had erroneously been reported that he had spoken to the press?
Would the error constitute "voluntary" surrender of his private
status?
A key issue raised by the Gertz case is that of publicity by
association. Many people who could not themselves be consid-
ered public figures are acquainted with, or associate in various
ways with, those who are. Will such associations draw an other-
wise private person into the vortex of a particular public issue,
or elevate him to public figure status? In such a case, the alleg-
edly defamatory publication would have to relate to the asso-
ciation that had projected the plaintiff into the limelight in
order to trigger the Sullivan rule; but how close and direct a
relationship would be necessary?
The basic problem with the Gertz decision appears to be
an unresolved and deep-seated tension between the individ-
ual's interest in privacy and the public's interest in knowing.
The privacy interest may remain more or less constant for the
average person, but the public interest in knowing varies
greatly depending on the issues involved. If Gertz simply
stands for the proposition that the privacy interest diminishes
as the public interest increases, then its rule is little more than
a highly circuitous and misleading way of preserving the
public-interest standard that was thought to control before the
decision was rendered.
Opportunity to Reply
The second major policy basis for distinguishing between
rights of recovery in defamation by public and private persons
is the presumed difference in their ability to reply to defama-
tory remarks. The Gertz Court reasoned that public officials
and public figures "usually enjoy significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication" than do private indi-
viduals, and "hence have a more realistic opportunity to coun-
teract false statements."33
After Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, it is clear
33. 418 U.S. at 344.
34. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Justices Brennan and Rehnquist concurred, noting that
the decision "implies no view upon the constitutionality of 'retraction' statutes afford-
19751
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
that states may not constitutionally require newspapers or
magazines to provide an aggrieved person with an opportunity
for reply; and there is no guarantee of reply for the average
individual by means of radio or television.35 Further, there is
no empirical data to support a conclusion that public persons
are generally wealthier and therefore more able to purchase
access to channels of mass communication than private per-
sons, nor should it be assumed that the Court indulged in any
such discriminatory presumption. Ability to pay is not an un-
known criterion in our legal framework, but it should not be
used as a means for determining substantive legal rights.
Bascially, then, one's opportunity to rebut a widely dis-
seminated defamation depends on the willingness of the news
media to cooperate. The Gertz Court appears to assume that
the affairs of public officials and public figures are more news-
worthy than those of private individuals, and that, as a conse-
quence, the news media will more readily seek them out to
obtain and publish their version of any public-interest issue in
which they are involved. But how accurate is this assumption?
How likely is it, for example, that American Opinion would
have sought out Elmer Gertz for his version of the Nuccio af-
fair, regardless of whether Gertz were a public or private per-
son? Assuming Gertz were a public person, all-purpose or lim-
ited, would any other news organ have been interested in tak-
ing up this particular controversy? What is deemed newswor-
thy by one publisher or broadcaster might not be considered
worth mentioning by another. In any event, will a reply
through an accessible second medium reach the audience that
counts-those who received the defamatory material from an-
ing plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require publica-
tion of a retraction." Id. at 258. Retraction statutes operate to reduce damages where
the publisher of defamatory statements voluntarily elects to retract. See Note, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1730, 1740 (1967).
35. The "fairness doctrine" of the 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq. (1970), does not require broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The scope
of the doctrine may be quite limited. See Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It has been argued that the doctrine should be abolished entirely
with the advent of cable television, which effectively undermines the "limited access"
rationale that was used as the constitutional justification for such regulation in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See Simmons, The Fairness Doc-
trine and Cable Television, 11 HARv. J. LEGIS. 629 (1974).
The broadcasting right of reply afforded political candidates is also of limited
scope. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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other source? Or will it merely fan the flames by spreading the
libel it is meant to rebut?
Reply through a medium over which one has no means of
control often proves less than satisfactory. Seldom do the news
media publish an unvarnished, verbatim reply, especially on a
matter of substantial public interest. Anyone who has ever
been quoted in the news may be uncomfortably familiar with
misinterpretation, unintended emphasis, critical omissions or
misleading elaboration-all perhaps well-intended, but none-
theless inaccurate. The hotter the controversy, the more likely
it is that these distortions will creep in, and the more certain
that reply will beget counter-reply, ultimately increasing both
the dissemination and the impact of the original libel. Reply
is clearly no substitute for uninvaded privacy." Such, however,
is the nature of newsworthiness, and the very strong policy
rooted in the first amendment demands toleration of the bad
in order to achieve the greater good. 7
Whatever value there may be in an opportunity to reply,
it seems evident that the opportunity itself turns not upon
one's public or private status, but on the newsworthiness of the
subject matter. The simple folk may wonder what the King is
doing tonight, and their interest may be largely a function of
his public status; but, for the most part, news has value inde-
pendent of the status of those involved. A death resulting from
an automobile accident will likely make the papers, whoever is
involved. If one of the persons is a United States senator, the
coverage will clearly be more widespread, thorough and sus-
tained than if he were John Doe. On the other hand, John Doe
may have less need of reply, and less difficulty in replying
within his relatively restricted community of associates. If,
however, Doe and the senator are involved in the same inci-
dent, they will both be swept into the vortex of public contro-
versy, regardless of who is "public" and who "private." When
the walls at Watergate began to crumble, the conduct of secre-
taries and minor functionaries was held up to the same searing
public scrutiny as that of the President.
Ill. OPINION OR FAIR COMMENT
Gertz contains dictum which may well signal the end of
36. The Gertz Court acknowledged the inadequacy of rebuttal as redress, but
asserted that opportunity to reply was nevertheless "[relevant] to our inquiry." 418
U.S. at 344 n.9.
37. See, e.g., id. at 340.
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Sullivan and its progeny and a shift toward the Black-Douglas
theory of absolute constitutional protection for publication of
defamatory opinion:3"
We begin with the common ground. Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correc-
tion not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas.3"
The decision leaves undefined the terms "idea" and "opinion,"
and it does not indicate how they may be distinguished from
defamatory falsehood, which enjoys no absolute constitutional
protection.
The Gertz dictum is the basis for the Court's decision in
Letter Carriers Branch 496 v. Austin,40 argued at the same time
as Gertz. In that case, federal postal employees sought dam-
ages against the Letter Carriers' Union for allegedly defama-
tory remarks published in a monthly union newsletter. The
publication described the plaintiffs as "scabs" and embellished
the term with a definition excerpted from "a well-known piece
of trade union literature, generally attributed to author Jack
London."'" The definition, several paragraphs in length, con-
cluded with the statement that "a SCAB is a traitor to his
God, his country, his family and his class."4
Plaintiffs' judgment for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages was upheld in the state courts,43 but the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding the speech absolutely pro-
tected under federal law, since "naming the appellees as scabs
was literally and factually true."44 As for the definition, " 'to
use loose language or unidentified slogans that are part of the
conventional give-and-take in our economic and political con-
38. E.g., id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black, J. concurring and dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959)
(Black, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas &
Black, JJ., dissenting).
39. 418 U.S. at 339-40.
40. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
41. Id. at 268.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 282-83.
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troversies-like "unfair" or "fascist"-is not to falsify facts.' ",4
The words were
obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to demon-
strate the Union's strong disagreement with the views of
those workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such
an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected
under federal law. Here, too, "there is no such thing as a
false idea."4
The constitutional impact of the Austin decision is not
clear, since the holding was based on the conclusion that the
"publication is protected under the federal labor laws," which
favor free and robust discussion in labor matters.47 The Court
did not consider the first amendment arguments advanced by
the union.4" It did, however, cite as authority Greenbelt Pub-
lishing Association v. Bresler19
The Bresler case involved newspaper accounts of city
council meetings, at which plaintiff's efforts to obtain bargain-
ing advantage in a land deal with the city were described by
some of the people attending the meeting as "blackmail."50 The
Court held that the defendant newspaper's reports of these
meetings, which repeated the "blackmail" charge, were "ac-
curate," "truthful" and "full reports of these public debates."'"
In concluding that the reports were absolutely privileged, the
Court said:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who
reached the word "blackmail" in either article would not
have understood exactly what was meant: it was Bresler's
public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were
being criticized. No reader could have thought that either
the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles re-
porting their words were charging Bresler with the com-
mission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the
most careless reader must have perceived that the word
was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet
used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating posi-
tion extremely unreasonable. Indeed, the record is com-
45. Id. at 284, quoting Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293,
295 (1943).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 286-87.
48. Id. at 283 n.15.
49. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 13.
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pletely devoid of evidence that anyone in the city of
Greenbelt or anywhere else thought Bresler had been
charged with a crime.2
The Court emphasized in both Austin and Bresler that
defendants' statements might have been unprivileged if they
had been misleading. In Bresler, the majority stated that, had
the reports been "truncated or distorted in such a way as to
extract the word 'blackmail' from the context in which it was
used at the public meatings," a different result would have
ensued. 3 The Austin decision noted that, in some situations,
rhetoric such as that employed by the Letter Carriers' Union
might be actionable, "particularly if some of its words were
taken out of context and used in such a way as to convey a false
representation of fact." 4
The Restatement of Torts has attempted to articulate the
constitutional protection afforded opinion or fair comment:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement
in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature
is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.5
The "only if" clause is apparently intended to embody the
"truncated or distorted" and "out of context" caveats of
Bresler and Austin.
The opinion exception in defamation law raises a number
of questions. False and defamatory facts contained in an ex-
pression of opinion appear to be actionable unless otherwise
privileged; but the line between fact and opinion is a hazy one
indeed. What about an opinion based solely on another opin-
ion? Must the facts known or assumed by both parties to the
communication be thought of as true? If so, the rule may give
less protection than that already afforded by Sullivan. In any
event, presumably the knowledge or assumption of the recipi-
ent of the communication is immaterial as long as the pub-
lisher meets the Sullivan or Gertz standard of care, whichever
is applicable, regarding the assumed facts.56
52. Id. at 14.
53. Id. at 13.
54. 418 U.S. at 286.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (Tent. Draft No. 21, May, 1975).
56. Compare Berg v. Printers' Ink Publishing Co., 54 F. Supp. 795, 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) ("[1The fact that the comment or criticism is one which is not reasonably
warranted by the facts upon which it is based or is fantastic or extravagant, is imma-
terial"), with Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051, 1053-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The
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The holdings in Bresler and Austin may be explained with-
out resort to an elaborate opinion rule. In both cases, the words,
whether characterized as fact or opinion, were found not rea-
sonably subject to a defamatory construction. In Bresler the
Court says just that.57 In Austin the words fall within a
recognized exception to the law of defamation: language that
is mere vituperation and abuse, or vulgar name-calling." Nei-
ther case rules out the possibility that sober and reflective
opinion which is false and defamatory may be actionable un-
less the publisher meets the Sullivan or Gertz standard of care,
whichever is applicable.
IV. DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
Private Matters
An earlier draft of the Restatement of Torts provided abso-
lute protection for a statement of opinion "at least if it is on a
matter of public concern."59 The implication was that the pro-
question for the court is ... whether plaintiff's comments are so obviously without
basis in fact as to be adjudged unfair or dishonest"). The Buckley court also stated
that "the critic enjoys a privilege to make such critical comments [on the published
work of an author] as long as the comment does not go beyond the published work
itself to attack the author personally." 327 F. Supp. at 1052-53. There is nothing in
Austin or Bresler, however, to suggest a distinction between an author's works and the
author himself, or to imply that the opinion privilege applies only to criticism of
writers.
57. 398 U.S. at 14.
58. The Austin Court acknowledged that its own decisions and those of the
National Labor Relations Board have traditionally accorded the parties to labor dis-
putes considerable latitude in the use of vituperative language: " '[Tihe most repul-
sive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless un-
truth.' " 418 U.S. at 284, quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966).
See also Cambria Clay Products Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 267 (1953), enforced, 215 F.2d 48
(6th Cir. 1954). Nor is the "vulgar name-calling" exception restricted to labor disputes.
E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966) ("bastards");
Botarmuzzi v. Shevack, 108 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ("bleached blond bastard,
a God damn son of a bitch and a bum and a tramp").
59. The earlier draft provided:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form
of an opinion. A statement of this nature, at least if it is on a matter of
public concern, is actionable, however, only if it also expresses, or implies
the assertion of, a false and defamatory fact which is not known or as-
sumed by both parties to the communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (Tent. Draft No. 21, April, 1975). The "at least"
clause was struck by the ALI at its meeting in May, 1975. 1975 ALI PROCEEDINGS 127.
As Justice Robert Braucher said, "[Tihe 'at least' leaves everything at sea." Id. at
124. The viewpoint of the Reporter, Professor John Wade, was that the "implications"
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tection of the opinion rule might be unavailable, or at least not
constitutionally required, if the statement concerned a non-
public matter. The conditional protection of the stringent
Sullivan standard might also be unavailable in such a case,
even if the statement involved a public official or public figure,
since the Sullivan rule does not cover a completely private
matter which neither touches on an official's fitness for office
nor relates to the public status of a public figure. 0 In that
event, the defendant's only source of constitutional protection,
if any, would be that provided by Gertz.
It is possible, however, that not even Gertz will provide
constitutional protection for a statement, whether of fact or
opinion, about a matter of no public interest. The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed this issue, but it is significant that
all of its decisions from Sullivan to Gertz have involved matters
of public concern, and that the emphasis of these decisions has
been on the public's interest in having access to information.6"
The question is academic if one concludes that virtually
any subject is a matter of public concern, whether or not it has
any legitimate informational or educative value. However, it is
quite conceivable that idle gossip about the affairs of private
individuals, and like matters, are of no public concern, and
perhaps not subject to constitutional protection under any cir-
cumstances."2
The key question in this context is whether the Court will,
or should, distinguish on constitutional grounds between var-
ious types of speech, using relative educative value as the
criterion. Such a distinction raises the specter of the "public
interest" definitional quagmire which the Court so assiduously
attempted to avoid in Gertz. The potential difficulty is a very
real one. Changing circumstances may make today's idle gossip
tomorrow's front-page news. Where the alleged defamation
involves purely private matters, it seems reasonable to require
of the constitutional decisions "are strong enough to apply to the private situation
too." Id. at 125.
60. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (the public's interest, and thus
the protection of the Sullivan rule, extends, in the case of a public official, only to
"anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office").
61. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 340 A.2d 767 (1975),
holding that Gertz does not apply to "purely private defamation" (slander of an em-
ployee accused of theft).
62. In such situations the aggrieved party might also have an action for invasion
of privacy. See text accompanying notes 85-97 infra. But not all jurisdictions recognize
this tort, and in any event the availability of one remedy is not generally thought to
preclude another appropriate one.
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the plaintiff to prove negligence on the defendant's part. That
is the minimum required for almost all other private torts, and
it would be anomalous to hold the private individual to a
higher standard for his words than for his acts.
Further, the Gertz rule can be narrowly interpreted as pro-
tecting only the news media, and not other persons or entities.
The holding is stated in terms of the need to safeguard the
rights of "a publisher or broadcaster."63 It is likely, however,
that the decision was intended to encompass defamation by
anyone, in any form;"4 there is no reason to provide less protec-
tion for non-medium defendants." If any differentiation is to
be made, the media probably should be afforded less protection
than the private individual, since they are composed of knowl-
edgeable professionals who owe a fiduciary duty to the public
and who have a correspondingly great capacity to do harm via
the spoken or written word.
Commercial Speech
Another possible candidate for exclusion from constitu-
tional protection for defamation is commercial speech. The
Court has excepted such speech from first amendment
protection in various contexts," but the issue has never been
63. 418 U.S. at 347.
64. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Gertz: "[The] result is
accomplished by requiring the plaintiff in each and every defamation action to prove
not only the defendant's culpability beyond his act of publishing defamatory material
but also actual damage to reputation. ... 418 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
65. In Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., Inc., 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975),
the court held that Gertz applies to non-media as well as to media defendants. Noting
that a number of United States Supreme Court cases applying Sullivan have involved
non-media defendants (who, however, were using the media), the court concluded that
private individuals may be "an important source of public interest items" and that a
distinction between media and non-media would give rise to "many gray areas." It
would pose "problems of application resulting in chaos," as, for example, in classifying
industry newsletters, amateur radio operators, credit reports, or publications of profes-
sional and social organizations. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 881. The "important source"
and "gray area" rationales did not deter the same court, however, from distinguishing
between "public" and "private" defamation. See note 61 supra. For an analysis of the
arguments for and against applying Gertz to non-media defendants, see Nimmer, Is
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 647-58 (1975); Comment, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions:
Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 902 (1974).
66. A significant recent decision, canvassing the authorities, is Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), which upholds
state authority to prohibit sexually discriminatory newspaper advertisements. See
Comment, Sex Discrimination in Help Wanted Advertising, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 183
(1974). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975), striking down a statute which
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dealt with directly in a defamation case. While it is true that
Sullivan involved a commercial advertisement, the Court
found that much more than "commercial speech" was in-
volved. It characterized the material in issue, ads detailing
civil rights activities in Alabama and appealing for contribu-
tions to the Martin Luther King, Jr., Defense Fund, as "edi-
torial advertisements" which "communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest pub-
lic interest and concern."6 Clearly this was no ordinary com-
mercial advertisement.
One area which may well lie outside the Sullivan umbrella
is that of mercantile credit reports. The Third Circuit excluded
such material from Sullivan protection in Grove v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc.,"8 a case decided at a time when the Sullivan
standard was thought to extend to all matters of public inter-
est. The court of appeals held that a private credit report in-
volving the financial status of the plaintiff did not constitute a
matter of public interest. 9 A crucial factor, in the court's view,
was the confidential nature of the report: "Plaintiff here is
denied that opportunity to respond to such false assertions
both because it lacks the very access to the medium which
Times and its progeny assumed, and for the more pernicious
reason that the source or nature of the assertions may never be
exposed."7 0
It is unclear whether the Gertz standard-minimum show-
ing of negligent publication-would apply to such a case. The
Gertz opinion, of course, is based on the assumption that non-
public figures lack access to the public media,' but it neverthe-
less requires a showing of negligence. Thus the Third Circuit's
conclusion that lack of opportunity to reply rules out any con-
stitutional protection is destroyed by Gertz. The confidential-
ity aspect of Grove, however, is not directly addressed in Gertz.
Nor, for that matter, does the Grove court deal with the relev-
prohibited advertisement in Virginia of out-of-state abortions. For a critical discussion
of the commercial speech issue, see DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid
Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 745 (1975).
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
68. 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
69. Id. at 437.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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ance, if any, of the purely commercial aspect of the transaction
involved.
If dissemination of purely private material that can only
be classified as idle gossip is to be given some protection by the
Gertz negligence rule,7" it can be argued that commercial
speech is at least as worthy of protection. On the other hand,
many areas of commercial speech, notably express sales war-
ranties, have never been thought to merit constitutional pro-
tection from strict liability,73 and to afford such protection
would effect a major change in present-day tort and sales law.
The differences between sales misrepresentations and
commercial defamation are obvious, but they may not be as
significant as they appear. Express warranties, for which the
seller can be held strictly liable, may go beyond the implied
warranties attached by law to the transferred goods them-
selves, and in many instances, the damage from defamatory
commercial speech may be substantially greater than that
from sales misrepresentations.
One notable similarity between sales misrepresentations
and commercial defamation-a factor which serves to distin-
guish both from idle gossip-is that in the commercial situa-
tion, both the publisher and the seller of goods are in the busi-
ness of making statements for a profit. Perhaps by analogy to
the risk-spreading rationale of strict products liability, it is
appropriate for a commercial disseminator of defamatory ma-
terial to bear the risk of his statements, even if innocent, as a
cost of doing business. The purveyor of idle gossip, on the other
hand, presumably is not in the business of rumor-mongering;
nor does the risk-spreading rationale apply. Thus, there may
be reason to except commercial speech from even the minimal
protection afforded by the Gertz negligence rule.
V. COMMON LAW RULES: DAMAGES AND PRIVILEGES
Damages
Sullivan and Gertz either determine or significantly affect
the common law standard of care for defamation actions; and
as previously noted, Gertz imposes substantial restrictions on
recoverable damages in such actions by requiring proof of ac-
72. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
73. E.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934), consid-
ered the seminal case on strict liability for express warranties.
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tual harm and by prohibiting the recovery of punitive damages
unless constitutional malice is shown.74
The actual-harm requirement of Gertz is unlikely to effect
any major change in the common law, or to impose any noticea-
bly greater burden of proof on the plaintiff. "Actual injury," as
defined by the Court, includes "impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering."75 It is highly unlikely that a defamed
plaintiff would choose to litigate at all unless one or more of
these damage elements were present, and normally the plain-
tiff seeks to prove such damages in any event, to increase the
likelihood and the amount of recovery.
The fact that Gertz establishes proof of actual harm as a
minimum requirement does not prevent the states from impos-
ing more stringent proof requirements for damages. Specifi-
cally, the states are free to maintain the common law distinc-
tion between libel and slander per se, and all other forms of
slander, a distinction which generally involves requiring proof
of special damages, or out-of-pocket loss, for the second classi-
fication."8 It is questionable whether this distinction should be
maintained, however, in view of the blurred lines between libel
and slander in modern society.77
The punitive damage restrictions of Gertz may have much
more impact. Punitive damage awards were very common in
pre-Gertz cases; but in view of the difficulty of proving consti-
tutional malice, such awards should be infrequent under pres-
ent law. Nothing in Gertz prohibits a state from excluding
recovery for punitive damages entirely, as some courts have
done. 8 The highly speculative nature of such damages, coupled
with the important first amendment considerations involved,
suggests that such punitive awards should be prohibited in all
defamation cases. As a practical matter, however, juries might
well express their indignation in a particularly egregious case
74. See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
75. 418 U.S. at 350.
76. The Restatement retains this distinction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 569-74 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). For a critical discussion of the damages issue in
defamation law, see Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 471, 498-
512 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Am. Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga.
App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962), in which an exasperated court, confronted with the
task of determining whether a defamatory television broadcast constituted slander or
libel, ducked the classification issue by coining the term "defamacast."
78. See note 10 supra.
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by inflating the compensatory damage award as a substitute
for punitive damages. To date, courts have shown considerable
reluctance to review jury awards of compensatory damages, but
a footnote caveat in Austin suggests that courts should exercise
greater supervision in this regard.79
Privileges
The common law has long recognized a number of privi-
leges, both absolute and conditional, in the law of defamation. 0
Typical of the absolute privileges are those permitting legisla-
tors, courts and public officials to make defamatory statements
in the conduct of their respective activities."' Probably the
most common conditional privilege is that which allows a per-
son to make statements which he reasonably believes necessary
to protect or further an important interest either of himself or
of another."'
An absolute privilege is presumably subject to no standard
of care, and therefore needs no constitutional protection under
Sullivan or Gertz; indeed, such a privilege may enjoy constitu-
tional protection in its own right. 3 Conditional privileges, how-
ever, are subject to forfeiture by abuse-that is, when the pub-
lisher's conduct falls below some specified level of care, usually
defined in terms of negligence or common law malice. 4
It is evident that the negligence standard for determining
abuse of conditional privilege has effectively been superseded
in those cases where the Gertz rule applies. If Gertz indeed does
not protect certain types of statements, such as idle private
gossip or commercial speech, then the negligence abuse-of-
privilege standard retains some usefulness. But for all situa-
tions covered by Gertz, the test for abuse of privilege will have
79. 418 U.S. 264, 287 n.17 (1974); cf. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d
638 (2d Cir. 1975), sustaining a summary judgment against a defamation claim
brought by one whom the court described as "libel-proof, i.e., so unlikely by virtue of
his life as a habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other than nominal
damages as to warrant dismissal of the case, involving as it does First Amendment
considerations." Id. at 639.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-612 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
81. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-91 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-95 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
83. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (legislator); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (judge); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (public official). The
Gravel case is grounded on the speech or debate clause of the United States Constitu-
tion (article I, § 6).
84. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 792-96 (4th ed. 1971).
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to become a showing of something akin to malice if the privi-
lege is to retain any independent meaning.
VI. INVASION OF PRIVACY
Throughout this article an individual's interest in his own
reputation has been treated as a kind of right to privacy. The
Gertz Court has underscored the inherent relation between def-
amation and privacy law by distinguishing between public and
private figures. Yet the torts of invasion of privacy and defama-
tion are very different in at least two important respects: first,
an invasion of privacy need not involve falsehood to be actiona-
ble; and second, even when falsehood is present, a plaintiff
need not show the kind of injury-public disgrace or ridi-
cule-that is the basis of a defamation action. It is generally
sufficient in an invasion of privacy case to show that some
matter has been made public, or a right to solitude invaded,
in an unreasonable or unjustified manner."
The tort of privacy invasion has been described as involv-
ing four distinct protected interests, invasion of any one of
which may give rise to a cause of action. A right of privacy may
be invaded by publicizing a matter which unreasonably places
another in a false light; by unreasonably publicizing a matter
concerning another's private life; by intentionally and unrea-
sonably intruding upon another's solitude or seclusion; or by
appropriating to one's own use or benefit another's name or
likeness. 6 The common law privileges applicable to the law of
defamation may also apply to invasion of privacy. 7 In addition,
there are constitutional restrictions on the tort law of privacy
invasion, although the scope of these restrictions is at present
uncertain.
False-Light Invasion of Privacy
In Time, Inc. v. Hill," the Supreme Court held that to
recover in a false-light action, the plaintiff must prove the de-
fendant knowingly placed him in false light in the public eye,
or did so with reckless disregard for the truth. Thus Hill estab-
lished for this type of privacy action the same constitutional
85. See Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 540 (1967).
86. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804-14 (4th ed. 1971).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 652F.G (Tent. Draft No. 21, May, 1975).
88. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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malice standard that Sullivan had applied to defamation of
public officials and public figures.
In Hill, what triggered application of the Sullivan rule was
the presence of "matters of public interest." 9 The fact that the
Hills were private persons, or at most involuntary public fig-
ures, was deemed irrelevant by the Court. After Gertz, the
continued vitality of the Hill decision is in substantial doubt."0
There seems to be no justification for holding the false-light
victim to a higher burden of proof than his private counterpart
in a defamation action. The only conceivable basis for doing so
is to assume either that the false-light victim's interest in his
privacy is less weighty than the defamation victim's interest in
his reputation, or that the defendant in a false-light case has a
correspondingly greater interest in publishing than a
defamation defendant does. Neither seems persuasive as a gen-
eral proposition.
Invasion of Solitude
The constitutional limitations on the tort of invasion of
solitude or public exposure of private life are equally unclear.
No falsehood or misleadingrepresentation need be present to
support this action, so the constitutional restrictions of
Sullivan and Gertz, which govern liability for publication of
false statements, are by definition inapplicable. It is possible,
however, that there may be a constitutional requirement of
culpability greater than mere negligence. The solitude-
invasion aspect of the privacy tort carries with it an implication
of intentional misconduct by the defendant, suggestive of the
Sullivan requirement of knowledge or recklessness. By analogy
to Gertz, negligent rather than intentional or reckless miscon-
duct would be constitutionally sufficient when the tortious in-
vasion involves publication and the victim is a private person."
There remains unresolved, however, the question of
whether truthful publication of matters concerning an individ-
89. Id. at 388.
90. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), a false-light
privacy invasion case decided after Gertz, the Court was not presented with the ques-
tion of whether the Sullivan standard continues to govern all public interest cases.
Justice Powell, concurring in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1048 n.2
(1975), noted that Gertz "calls into question the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill."
91. Tortious invasion of solitude, however, does not require any element of publi-
cation, and if the alleged intrusion involved no publication or other conduct classifiable
as speech, the defendant would not be entitled to first amendment protection.
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ual's private life is entitled to constitutional protection when
those matters are of public interest or concern, regardless of
whether the victim is deemed a public figure." In Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn," the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment prohibited a state from imposing tort sanctions for
an invasion of privacy arising from the accurate publication of
a rape victim's name, where the information was obtained from
judicial records of a criminal prosecution that were open to
public inspection. 4 The decision seems based on the public's
right to know about matters of public interest or concern, even
when the subject of this interest is a private figure.
The scope of the Cox holding is rendered uncertain by two
factors: first, the Court suggested that states may be able to
protect an individual's interest in his privacy by prohibiting
public disclosure of such matters if the prohibition is "by
means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of
private information"; 5 and second, the Court emphasized the
fact that the defendant did not obtain the victim's name "in
an improper fashion."" The suggestion that improper conduct
by the defendant might limit the availability of constitutional
protection is ambiguous. The Court might have been referring
solely to violations of appropriate state prohibitions, or the
caveat might also have been intended to include other forms
of culpable misconduct such as theft of the information, failure
to obtain the subject's permission to publish, or publication of
some private matter of no public interest or concern. In any
event, Cox can hardly be read as an outright prohibition
against imposing tort liability for publication of matters of
public interest, much less matters of purely private concern.
Appropriation of Name or Likeness
The remaining branch of the privacy tort involves the ap-
propriation of a person's name or likeness for the benefit of
another. Although it may involve an intrusion upon individual
privacy, a primary purpose of the appropriation tort is to pre-
vent unjust enrichment of the defendant at his victim's ex-
pense. Cases in this category most frequently arise when the
92. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971).
93. 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975).
94. Id. at 1044, 1046.
95. Id. at 1047.
96. Id. at 1047.
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plaintiffs name or likeness has some commercial value, and
the defendant seeks to exploit this value without paying the
plaintiff or obtaining his consent. 7
If such a commercial exploitation does not significantly
touch upon matters of public interest or concern, it is arguable,
as in the case of purely commercial defamation, that no first
amendment restrictions apply, and that, accordingly, the
states are free to fashion such standards of care and rules of
damages as they see fit. Indeed, the case for freedom from
constitutional strictures may be stronger here than in the case
of commercial defamation, since the unjust enrichment ele-
ment substantially weakens the equities of the defendant's
case.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court distin-
guished between public and private persons for purposes of
determining the standard of care applicable to defendants in
defamation actions. There is substantial doubt as to whether
the Gertz rule will achieve its stated purpose: to avoid the
necessity for trial courts' making ad hoc determinations as to
the appropriate standard of care. Nor is it clear that the rule
accurately reflects the avowed policies and constitutional con-
siderations in this area. Whether the appropriate test in a defa-
mation action is negligent publication, constitutional malice,
or some other standard, is a question that involves issues sub-
stantially independent of the victim's status as a public or
private person. If the public's interest in knowing is sufficiently
great, that interest should be the decisive factor in determining
the applicable standard of care for publication of false and
defamatory statements, regardless of the plaintiff's status.
In addition, the Gertz rule has created a potential anomaly
in the privacy area. If the holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill" re-
mains viable after Gertz, the defendant in a false-light invasion
of privacy case is afforded the full protection of the Sullivan
constitutional malice standard, while his counterpart in a defa-
mation action can be held liable for mere negligence in the
publication of false material. There appears to be no reason for
97. Compare Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974), with Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
98. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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the gross disparity in burden of proof in two such similar ac-
tions.
A number of issues remain unresolved regarding applica-
tion of the first amendment to the law of defamation and inva-
sion of privacy. Among the most pressing are questions regard-
ing the scope of the opinion rule in defamation law, and the
applicability of first amendment protection to statements such
as private gossip and commercial speech, which arguably in-
volve no matters of public interest or concern. Inherent in these
issues, of course, are questions as to the precise definition of
"matters of public interest or concern" -a concept which the
Court unsuccessfully sought to side-step in the Gertz decision.
In any event, the Gertz case is laudable for the substantial
restrictions it imposes upon punitive damage recoveries in def-
amation actions. The apparent trend among states toward
complete elimination of punitive damages in defamation ac-
tions" should be extended at least to tortious invasions of pri-
vacy involving publication or speech. Awarding punitive dam-
ages is a questionable practice in any area of tort law, and the
issue is particularly acute where first amendment interests are
involved. Restrictions on punitive damages will require greater
vigilance on the part of the courts in monitoring jury verdicts,
to assure that in cases involving particularly egregious or offen-
sive fact situations, juries do not grant exemplary awards in the
guise of compensatory damages.
99. See note 10 supra.
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